The Arab Grain Crisis Shifts from Bread to Feed

On September 4, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) lowered its estimate for global cereal production in 2026 to 2.98 billion tonnes, the largest annual decline since 2018. Nevertheless, the stock-to-use ratio remains at 31.6%, which is historically comfortable. Paradoxically, the cereal price index rose by 2.2% in August, with wheat reaching a level 15% higher than the previous year, accompanied by increases in corn and barley. The global market is not suffering from absolute scarcity; rather, it is paying a higher price to secure the right grain, from the right origin, and at the right time, amid Black Sea disruptions and shipping and energy risks.

This is the information that will explain a large portion of Arab government decisions between October 2026 and March 2027. While an improved wheat crop is expected to reduce some foreign purchases, growing consumption of meat and poultry increases the need for corn and barley in a manner hard to compensate for with domestic wheat. Algeria, for instance, is heading toward roughly 5 million tonnes of grain, its largest harvest since 2019; yet, expected import needs stand at 14.5 million tonnes, with corn alone accounting for 5 million tonnes—10% above the five-year average due to animal feed. In Saudi Arabia, expected grain imports stand at 15 million tonnes, including 4 million tonnes of corn and 5 million tonnes of barley, reflecting increases of 20% and 12% over the average. Here lies the turning point: "bread sovereignty" may improve while the food economy's reliance on external sources increases.

Therefore, stock policy during the winter is likely to shift from measuring wheat tonnage alone to managing a "Grain Portfolio": wheat for flour mills, corn and barley for animal feed, and rice for direct consumption. This reading is supported by FAO projections of rising global corn trade alongside continued feed demand, at a time when greater uncertainty surrounds Black Sea wheat and barley flows. The practical outcome will be tenders with more diversified origins, temporally distributed purchases, and an inclination toward holding larger feed grain stocks when storage capacities permit.

In Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, the new winter planting season begins from a much better position than last year. Morocco estimated its crop at around 9 million tonnes following the return of rains and higher dam reserves, while Tunisia reduced its expected wheat import needs to about 1.8 million tonnes following a grain harvest 20% above average. Most likely in the fourth quarter, procurement prices, improved seeds, fertilizers, and tariff policies will be used to protect wheat and barley farming from falling prices after a good harvest, while reopening imports at a level that maintains a safe stock. Libya enters winter from the opposite side: grain production near 150,000 tonnes and import requirements of 3.3 million tonnes, making exchange rates and freight costs a direct component of the price of bread.

As for Mauritania, it deserves a different perspective, as the government has already launched the 2026/2027 rainy season and a program to create ten thousand agricultural jobs, aiming in the future to cover rice needs locally. On September 1, discussions began on a Mauritanian-Italian project to reclaim between 10,000 and 20,000 hectares and introduce wheat more broadly into the agricultural system. If the project progresses from concept to funding and execution arrangements during the winter, it will mark the most significant new Arab shift in grain cultivation during this period, as it adds wheat to a strategy that previously relied more heavily on rice and rainfed crops.

In Iraq, water will dictate the nature of decisions, as 2026 grain production is estimated at around 6.5 million tonnes, including 5.6 million tonnes of wheat, while rice exceeded its historical average by more than double. However, authorities cut surface-water irrigated areas by 50% in some southern regions, while corn import needs are rising to around one million tonnes due to feed demand. Therefore, the 2026/2027 winter plan is likely to link wheat expansion to available water and modern irrigation rather than land area alone. Syria enters the season with a wheat crop of nearly 2.7 million tonnes, the highest since 2020, but it still requires about two million tonnes of imports; transport and financing costs will continue to impact consumption even with an improved harvest.

Meanwhile, Jordan and Lebanon will address the issue through storage and ports: Jordan requires nearly 3 million tonnes of imported grain and maintains wheat and barley reserves sufficient for about 7 to 10 months, making proactive tenders likely to continue rather than waiting for price movements. Lebanon needs about 1.3 million tonnes of imports in 2026/2027, leaving freight and insurance margins as sensitive as the price of the grain itself. In Palestine, a harsher constraint presents itself: in Gaza, by June, only 448 hectares of agricultural land remained intact and accessible—just 3% of total farmland. During the winter, the grain supply there will be determined by opening commercial routes and facilitating the entry of food, seeds, and fuel before it is determined by the local harvest.

In the Gulf, the UAE, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain are moving to deepen a different model: purchasing resilience rather than attempting to produce every grain locally. In July, the UAE adopted a new law regulating strategic reserves and obligating registered suppliers and traders to adhere to storage and disclosure rules, with its operational impact on inventory management expected to begin in the coming months. Qatar reached 98% completion on the Hamad Port storage project; with a capacity of 300,000 tonnes, it features facilities to process and store rice and other essential commodities, in parallel with boosting wheat and rice shipments. Oman will continue its 5 million Omani Rial wheat support initiative through 2027, alongside 48 facilities for storing strategic commodities. Amid regional risks, Kuwait and Bahrain will continue to tighten oversight of stocks and supplier flows rather than expanding water-intensive grain farming.

In a different context, Yemen, Djibouti, and the Comoros face a more delicate price equation. Yemen requires about 5.2 million tonnes of imported grain in 2026, meaning foreign currency shortages or disruptions to fuel and ports can inflate food costs even when global stocks are sufficient. Djibouti has already activated a government team to monitor imported commodity stocks and supply chains. In the Comoros, where rice is the staple food and domestic production is limited, the system is gradually moving to broaden the role of private sector importers following the reform of a highly concentrated market—making import competition and stock stability the two most critical measures at the start of 2027.

As for Sudan and Somalia, climate and conflict may overshadow conventional trade tools. In Sudan, June to mid-August rainfall was below average by about 20% in Sennar and 30% in Gedaref prior to a harvest starting in November; meaning the outcome of the season will manifest within the fourth quarter itself, determining the scale of interventions, aid, and grain requirements. Somalia enters the "Deyr" season following the collapse of the preceding season's harvest to just 15,600 tonnes—75% below the five-year average—making seed distribution, farmer support, and rapid imports even more sensitive to any new rainfall anomalies.

The most important Arab indicator through March 2027 will not be the price of wheat alone; we must take into account the spread between wheat prices and those of corn and barley, and subsequently monitor poultry, egg, and meat prices. If feed grains continue to rise faster, governments will begin adjusting feed subsidies, accelerating tenders, and increasing corn and barley stocks before consumers feel a crisis at the bakery. It is then that the shift will become fully apparent: the first food pressure in 2027 may reach the dinner table via the chicken that ate the grain, not via the grain consumed directly by humans.